Login

Username:

Password:

Remember me



Lost Password?

Register now!

Related Sponsor

Related Sponsor

Headlines


Recent Headlines
Vuln: Multiple Cisco Products CVE-2015-0744 Denia... SecurityFocus Vulns
Multiple Cisco Products CVE-2015-0744 Denial of Service Vulnerability
Vuln: Oracle Java SE CVE-2015-0486 Remote Securit... SecurityFocus Vulns
Oracle Java SE CVE-2015-0486 Remote Security Vulnerability
Vuln: Oracle Java SE CVE-2015-0469 Remote Securit... SecurityFocus Vulns
Oracle Java SE CVE-2015-0469 Remote Security Vulnerability
Vuln: OpenSSL CVE-2015-0204 Man in the Middle Sec... SecurityFocus Vulns
OpenSSL CVE-2015-0204 Man in the Middle Security Bypass Vulnerability
TA15-120A: Securing End-to-End Communications US-CERT
Original release date: April 30, 2015

Systems Affected

Networked systems

Overview

Securing end-to-end communications plays an important role in protecting privacy and preventing some forms of man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Recently, researchers described a MITM attack used to inject code, causing unsecured web browsers around the world to become unwitting participants in a distributed denial-of-service attack. That same code can be employed to deliver an exploit for a particular vulnerability or to take other arbitrary actions.

Description

A MITM attack occurs when a third party inserts itself between the communications of a client and a server. MITM attacks as a general class are not new. Classic MITM attacks (e.g., ARP Spoofing) focus on redirecting network communications. By definition, network infrastructure under attacker control is vulnerable to MITM. However, as technology evolves, new methods for performing MITM attacks evolve as well.

Currently, there is no single technology or configuration to prevent all MITM attacks. However, increasing the complexity with multiple layers of defense may raise the cost for the attacker. Increasing the attacker’s cost in time, effort, or money can be an effective deterrent to avoiding future network compromise.

Generally, encryption and digital certificates provide an effective safeguard against MITM attacks, assuring both the confidentiality and integrity of communications. As a result, modern MITM attacks have focused on taking advantage of weaknesses in the cryptographic infrastructure (e.g., certificate authorities (CAs), web browser certificate stores) or the encryption algorithms and protocols themselves.

Impact

MITM attacks are critical because of the wide range of potential impacts—these include the exposure of sensitive information, modification of trusted data, and injection of data.

Solution

Employing multiple network and browser protection methods forces an attacker to develop different tactics, techniques, and procedures to circumvent the new security configuration.

US-CERT recommends reviewing the following mitigations to reduce vulnerability to MITM attacks:

Update Transport Layer Security and Secure Socket Layer (TLS/SSL)

US-CERT recommends upgrading TLS to 1.1 or higher and ensuring TLS 1.0 and SSL 1, 2, 3.x are disabled, unless required. TLS 1.0 clients can fall back to version 3.0 of the SSL protocol, which is vulnerable to a padding oracle attack when Cypher-Block Chaining mode is used. This method is commonly referred to as the "POODLE" (Padding Oracle on Downgraded Legacy Encryption) attack. Vulnerable TLS implementations can be updated by applying the patch provided by the vendor. Vendor information is available in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) entry for CVE-2014-3566 [1] or in CERT Vulnerability Note VU#577193 [2]. See US-CERT TA14-290A [3] for additional information on this vulnerability.

Utilize Certificate Pinning

Certificate pinning [4] is a method of associating X.509 certificate and its public key to a specific CA or root. Typically, certificates are validated by checking a verifiable chain of trust back to a trusted root certificate. Certificate pinning bypasses this validation process and allows the user to trust “this certificate only” or “trust only certificates signed by this certificate.” Please use the following resources to configure your browser for certificate pinning:

Microsoft Certificate Trust

The Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) 5.2 employs a feature named "Certificate Trust" for SSL/TLS certificate pinning. This feature is intended to detect and stop MITM attacks that leverage Public Key Infrastructure. [5]

To use the Certificate Trust, you must provide a list of websites you want to protect and certificate pinning rules applicable to those websites. In order to do this, work with the Certificate Trust Configuration feature of the graphical application or use the Configuration Wizard to automatically configure EMET with the recommended settings. [6] Also, ensure period defaults are updated through patching.

Browser Certificate Pinning

Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox, among others, perform certificate pinning. They conduct a variation of certificate pinning using the HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS), which pre-loads a specific set of public key hashes into the HSTS configuration, limiting valid certificates to only those with the specified indicated public key. Chrome uses HTTPS pins for most Google properties. It uses whitelisted public keys which include keys from Verisign, Google Internet Authority, Equifax, and GeoTrust. Thus, Chrome will not accept certificates for Google properties from other CAs.

Firefox 32 on desktop and later (Firefox 34 and later on Android) has the ability to use certificate pinning. It also has the ability to enforce built-in pinsets (mapping of public keys) information to domains. Firefox will pin all sites that Chrome already does, pin their own sites after audit and cleansing, and pin other popular sites that are already in good standing. Please visit this site on How to Use Pinning [7] and for more information.

Implement DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)

DANE is a protocol that allows certificates (X.509) commonly used for TLS. DANE is bound to DNS which uses Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). A working group in the Internet Engineering Task Force of DANE developed a new type of DNS record that allows a domain itself to sign statements about which entities are authorized to represent it. [8]

Google Chrome does not use DANE but uses an add-on [9] for support. Mozilla Firefox also uses an add-on [10] to check the existence and validity of DNSSEC.

Use Network Notary Servers

Network notary servers aim to improve the security of communications between computers and websites by enabling browsers to verify website authenticity without relying on CAs. CAs are often considered a security risk because they can be compromised. [11] As a result, browsers can deem fraudulent sites trustworthy and are left vulnerable to MITM attacks.

Each network notary server, or group of servers, is public and can be operated by public/private organizations or individuals. These servers regularly monitor websites and build a history of each site’s certificate data over time. When a browser equipped with a network notary add-on communicates with a website and obtains its certificate information, a user-designated network notary server supplies the browser with historical certificate data for that site. If certificate information provided by the website is inconsistent with the notary’s historical data, a MITM attack could be at play. [12]

References

Revision History

  • April 30, 2015: Initial Release

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


TA15-119A: Top 30 Targeted High Risk Vulnerabilit... US-CERT
Original release date: April 29, 2015 | Last revised: May 06, 2015

Systems Affected

Systems running unpatched software from Adobe, Microsoft, Oracle, or OpenSSL. 

Overview

Cyber threat actors continue to exploit unpatched software to conduct attacks against critical infrastructure organizations. As many as 85 percent of targeted attacks are preventable [1].

This Alert provides information on the 30 most commonly exploited vulnerabilities used in these attacks, along with prevention and mitigation recommendations.

It is based on analysis completed by the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre (CCIRC) and was developed in collaboration with our partners from Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Australian Cyber Security Centre.

Description

Unpatched vulnerabilities allow malicious actors entry points into a network. A set of vulnerabilities are consistently targeted in observed attacks.

Impact

A successful network intrusion can have severe impacts, particularly if the compromise becomes public and sensitive information is exposed. Possible impacts include:

  • Temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information,
  • Disruption to regular operations,
  • Financial losses relating to restoring systems and files, and
  • Potential harm to an organization’s reputation.

Solution

Maintain up-to-date software

The attack vectors frequently used by malicious actors such as email attachments, compromised “watering hole” websites, and other tools often rely on taking advantage of unpatched vulnerabilities found in widely used software applications. Patching is the process of repairing vulnerabilities found in these software components.

It is necessary for all organizations to establish a strong ongoing patch management process to ensure the proper preventive measures are taken against potential threats. The longer a system remains unpatched, the longer it is vulnerable to being compromised. Once a patch has been publicly released, the underlying vulnerability can be reverse engineered by malicious actors in order to create an exploit. This process has been documented to take anywhere from 24-hours to four days. Timely patching is one of the lowest cost yet most effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to the threats facing its network.

Patch commonly exploited vulnerabilities

Executives should ensure their organization’s information security professionals have patched the following software vulnerabilities. Please see patching information for version specifics.

Microsoft
CVEAffected ProductsPatching Information
CVE-2006-3227​Internet ExplorerMicrosoft Malware Protection Encyclopedia Entry
CVE-2008-2244Office WordMicrosoft Security Bulletin MS08-042
CVE-2009-3129Office
Office for Mac
Open XML File Format Converter for Mac
Office Excel Viewer
Excel
Office Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS09-067
​CVE-2009-3674​Internet Explorer​Microsoft Security Bulletin MS09-072
CVE-2010-0806​​Internet ExplorerMicrosoft Security Bulletin MS10-018
CVE-2010-3333Office
Office for Mac
Open XML File Format Converter for Mac
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-087
CVE-2011-0101ExcelMicrosoft Security Bulletin MS11-021
CVE-2012-0158Office
SQL Server
BizTalk Server
Commerce Server
Visual FoxPro
Visual Basic
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS12-027
CVE-2012-1856Office
SQL Server
Commerce Server
Host Integration Server
Visual FoxPro Visual Basic
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS12-060
​CVE-2012-4792​Internet Explorer​Microsoft Security Bulletin MS13-008
CVE-2013-0074​Silverlight and Developer RuntimeMicrosoft Security Bulletin MS13-022
CVE-2013-1347​Internet ExplorerMicrosoft Security Bulletin MS13-038
CVE-2014-0322​​​Internet ExplorerMicrosoft Security Bulletin MS14-012
CVE-2014-1761Microsoft Word
Office Word Viewer
Office Compatibility Pack
Office for Mac
Word Automation Services on SharePoint Server
Office Web Apps
Office Web Apps Server
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS14-017
​CVE-2014-1776​Internet ExplorerMicrosoft Security Bulletin MS14-021
CVE-2014-4114​WindowsMicrosoft Security Bulletin MS14-060
Oracle
CVEAffected ProductsPatching Information
CVE-2012-1723Java Development Kit, SDK, and JREOracle Java SE Critical Patch Update Advisory - June 2012
CVE-2013-2465Java Development Kit and JREOracle Java SE Critical Patch Update Advisory - June 2013
Adobe
CVEAffected ProductsPatching Information
​CVE-2009-3953Reader Acrobat ​Adobe Security Bulletin APSB10-02​
​CVE-2010-0188​Reader AcrobatAdobe Security Bulletin APSB10-07
CVE-2010-2883Reader Acrobat ​Adobe Security Bulletin APSB10-21
CVE-2011-0611​Flash Player
AIR
Reader
Acrobat
Adobe Security Bulletin APSB11-07
Adobe Security Bulletin APSB11-08​
​CVE-2011-2462Reader Acrobat ​Adobe Security Bulletin APSB11-30
​CVE-2013-0625ColdFusion​Adobe Security Bulletin APSB13-03
CVE-2013-0632​ColdFusionAdobe Security Bulletin APSB13-03
​CVE-2013-2729​Reader AcrobatAdobe Security Bulletin APSB13-15
​CVE-2013-3336​ColdFusionAdobe Security Bulletin APSB13-13
CVE-2013-5326​ColdFusionAdobe Security Bulletin APSB13-27
CVE-2014-0564Flash Player
AIR
AIR SDK & Compiler
Adobe Security Bulletin APSB14-22
OpenSSL
CVEAffected ProductsPatching Information
CVE-2014-0160OpenSSLCERT Vulnerability Note VU#720951

 

Implement the following four mitigation strategies.

As part of a comprehensive security strategy, network administrators should implement the following four mitigation strategies, which can help prevent targeted cyber attacks.

RankingMitigation StrategyRationale
1Use application whitelisting to help prevent malicious software and unapproved programs from running.Application whitelisting is one of the best security strategies as it allows only specified programs to run, while blocking all others, including malicious software.
2Patch applications such as Java, PDF viewers, Flash, web browsers and Microsoft Office.Vulnerable applications and operating systems are the target of most attacks. Ensuring these are patched with the latest updates greatly reduces the number of exploitable entry points available to an attacker.
3Patch operating system vulnerabilities.
4Restrict administrative privileges to operating systems and applications based on user duties.Restricting these privileges may prevent malware from running or limit its capability to spread through the network.

It is recommended that users review US-CERT Security Tip (ST13-003) and CCIRC’s Mitigation Guidelines for Advanced Persistent Threats for additional background information and to assist in the detection of, response to, and recovery from malicious activity linked to advance persistent threats [2, 3].

 

References

Revision History

  • April 29, 2015: Initial release

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


TA15-105A: Simda Botnet US-CERT
Original release date: April 15, 2015

Systems Affected

Microsoft Windows

Overview

The Simda botnet – a network of computers infected with self-propagating malware – has compromised more than 770,000 computers worldwide [1].

The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in collaboration with Interpol and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has released this Technical Alert to provide further information about the Simda botnet, along with prevention and mitigation recommendations.

Description

Since 2009, cyber criminals have been targeting computers with unpatched software and compromising them with Simda malware [2]. This malware may re-route a user’s Internet traffic to websites under criminal control or can be used to install additional malware. 

The malicious actors control the network of compromised systems (botnet) through backdoors, giving them remote access to carry out additional attacks or to “sell” control of the botnet to other criminals [1]. The backdoors also morph their presence every few hours, allowing low anti-virus detection rates and the means for stealthy operation [3].    

Impact

A system infected with Simda may allow cyber criminals to harvest user credentials, including banking information; install additional malware; or cause other malicious attacks. The breadth of infected systems allows Simda operators flexibility to load custom features tailored to individual targets.

Solution

Users are recommended to take the following actions to remediate Simda infections:

  • Use and maintain anti-virus software - Anti-virus software recognizes and protects your computer against most known viruses. It is important to keep your anti-virus software up-to-date (see Understanding Anti-Virus Software for more information).
  • Change your passwords - Your original passwords may have been compromised during the infection, so you should change them (see Choosing and Protecting Passwords for more information).
  • Keep your operating system and application software up-to-date - Install software patches so that attackers cannot take advantage of known problems or vulnerabilities. Many operating systems offer automatic updates. If this option is available, you should enable it (see Understanding Patches for more information).
  • Use anti-malware tools - Using a legitimate program that identifies and removes malware can help eliminate an infection. Users can consider employing a remediation tool (examples below) that will help with the removal of Simda from your system.

          Kaspersky Lab : http://www.kaspersky.com/security-scan

          Microsoft: http://www.microsoft.com/security/scanner/en-us/default.aspx

          Trend Micro: http://housecall.trendmicro.com/

  • Check to see if your system is infected – The link below offers a simplified check for beginners and a manual check for experts.

          Cyber Defense Institute:  http://www.cyberdefense.jp/simda/

The above are examples only and do not constitute an exhaustive list. The U.S. government does not endorse or support any particular product or vendor.

References

Revision History

  • April 15, 2015: Initial Release

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


TA15-103A: DNS Zone Transfer AXFR Requests May Le... US-CERT
Original release date: April 13, 2015 | Last revised: April 15, 2015

Systems Affected

Misconfigured Domain Name System (DNS) servers that respond to global Asynchronous Transfer Full Range (AXFR) requests.

Overview

A remote unauthenticated user may request a DNS zone transfer from a public-facing DNS server. If improperly configured, the DNS server may respond with information about the requested zone, revealing internal network structure and potentially sensitive information.

Description

AXFR is a protocol for “zone transfers” for replication of DNS data across multiple DNS servers. Unlike normal DNS queries that require the user to know some DNS information ahead of time, AXFR queries reveal resource records including subdomain names [1]. Because a zone transfer is a single query, it could be used by an adversary to efficiently obtain DNS data.  

A well-known problem with DNS is that zone transfer requests can disclose domain information; for example, see CVE-1999-0532 and a 2002 CERT/CC white paper [2][3]. However, the issue has regained attention due to recent Internet scans still showing a large number of misconfigured DNS servers. Open-source, tested scripts are now available to scan for the possible exposure, increasing the likelihood of exploitation [4].

Impact

A remote unauthenticated user may observe internal network structure, learning information useful for other directed attacks.

Solution

Configure your DNS server to respond only to zone transfer (AXFR) requests from known IP addresses. Many open-source resources give instructions on reconfiguring your DNS server. For example, see this AXFR article for information on testing and fixing the configuration of a BIND DNS server. US-CERT does not endorse or support any particular product or vendor.

References

Revision History

  • April 13, 2015: Initial Release

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


TA15-098A: AAEH US-CERT
Original release date: April 09, 2015

Systems Affected

  • Microsoft Windows 95, 98, Me, 2000, XP, Vista, 7, and 8
  • Microsoft Server 2003, Server 2008, Server 2008 R2, and Server 2012

Overview

AAEH is a family of polymorphic downloaders created with the primary purpose of downloading other malware, including password stealers, rootkits, fake antivirus, and ransomware.

The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in collaboration with Europol, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), released this Technical Alert to provide further information about the AAEH botnet, along with prevention and mitigation recommendations.

Description

AAEH is often propagated across networks, removable drives (USB/CD/DVD), and through ZIP and RAR archive files. Also known as VObfus, VBObfus, Beebone or Changeup, the polymorphic malware has the ability to change its form with every infection. AAEH is a polymorphic downloader with more than 2 million unique samples. Once installed, it morphs every few hours and rapidly spreads across the network.  AAEH has been used to download other malware families, such as Zeus, Cryptolocker, ZeroAccess, and Cutwail.

Impact

A system infected with AAEH may be employed to distribute malicious software, harvest users' credentials for online services, including banking services, and extort money from users by encrypting key files and then demanding payment in order to return the files to a readable state. AAEH is capable of defeating anti-virus products by blocking connections to IP addresses associated with Internet security companies and by preventing anti-virus tools from running on infected machines.  

Solution

Users are recommended to take the following actions to remediate AAEH infections:

References

Revision History

  • April 9, 2015: Initial Release

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


TA15-051A: Lenovo Superfish Adware Vulnerable to ... US-CERT
Original release date: February 20, 2015 | Last revised: February 24, 2015

Systems Affected

Lenovo consumer PCs that have Superfish VisualDiscovery installed.

Overview

Superfish adware installed on some Lenovo PCs install a non-unique trusted root certification authority (CA) certificate, allowing an attacker to spoof HTTPS traffic.

Description

Starting in September 2014, Lenovo pre-installed Superfish VisualDiscovery spyware on some of their PCs. This software intercepts users’ web traffic to provide targeted advertisements.  In order to intercept encrypted connections (those using HTTPS), the software installs a trusted root CA certificate for Superfish. All browser-based encrypted traffic to the Internet is intercepted, decrypted, and re-encrypted to the user’s browser by the application – a classic man-in-the-middle attack.  Because the certificates used by Superfish are signed by the CA installed by the software, the browser will not display any warnings that the traffic is being tampered with.  Since the private key can easily be recovered from the Superfish software, an attacker can generate a certificate for any website that will be trusted by a system with the Superfish software installed.  This means websites, such as banking and email, can be spoofed without a warning from the browser.

Although Lenovo has stated they have discontinued the practice of pre-installing Superfish VisualDiscovery, the systems that came with the software already installed will continue to be vulnerable until corrective actions have been taken.

To detect a system with Superfish installed, look for a HTTP GET request to:

superfish.aistcdn.com

The full request will look like:

http://superfish.aistcdn.com/set.php?ID=[GUID]&Action=[ACTION]

Where [ACTION] is at least 1, 2, or 3.  1 and then 2 are sent when a computer is turned on. 3 is sent when a computer is turned off.    

Superfish uses a vulnerable SSL decryption library by Komodia. Other applications that use the library may be similarly affected. Please refer to CERT Vulnerability Note VU#529496 for more details and updates.

Impact

A machine with Superfish VisualDiscovery installed will be vulnerable to SSL spoofing attacks without a warning from the browser.

Solution

Uninstall Superfish VisualDiscovery and associated root CA certificate

Users should uninstall Superfish VisualDiscovery. Lenovo has provided a tool to uninstall Superfish and remove all associated certificates.

It is also necessary to remove affected root CA certificates. Simply uninstalling the software does not remove the certificate. Microsoft provides guidance on deleting and managing certificates in the Windows certificate store. In the case of Superfish VisualDiscovery, the offending trusted root certification authority certificate is issued to “Superfish, Inc.”

Mozilla provides similar guidance for their software, including the Firefox and Thunderbird certificate stores.

References

Revision History

  • February 20, 2015: Initial release
  • February 20, 2015: Clarified software release dates
  • February 24, 2015: Updated description and solution details

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


TA14-353A: Targeted Destructive Malware US-CERT
TA14-329A: Regin Malware US-CERT
TA14-323A: Microsoft Windows Kerberos KDC Remote ... US-CERT
TA14-318B: Microsoft Windows OLE Automation Array... US-CERT
News: Change in Focus SecurityFocus News
News: Google: 'no timetable' on China talks SecurityFocus News
News: Monster botnet held 800,000 people's detail... SecurityFocus News
News: Latvian hacker tweets hard on banking whist... SecurityFocus News
News: MS uses court order to take out Waledac bot... SecurityFocus News
Brief: Google offers bounty on browser bugs SecurityFocus News
Brief: Cyberattacks from U.S. "greatest concern" SecurityFocus News
Brief: Microsoft patches as fraudsters target IE ... SecurityFocus News
Brief: Attack on IE 0-day refined by researchers SecurityFocus News
News: Twitter attacker had proper credentials SecurityFocus News
News: PhotoDNA scans images for child abuse SecurityFocus News
News: Conficker data highlights infected networks SecurityFocus News
Infocus: Enterprise Intrusion Analysis, Part One SecurityFocus News
SANSFIRE 2011 SANS Information Security Reading Room
Bugtraq: [SECURITY] [DSA 3297-1] unattended-upgra... SecurityFocus Vulns
SANSFIRE 2011 @RISK: The Consensus Security Alert
Infocus: Responding to a Brute Force SSH Attack SecurityFocus News
Mass SQL Injection for Malware Distribution SANS Information Security Reading Room
Bugtraq: [SECURITY] [DSA 3296-1] libcrypto++ secu... SecurityFocus Vulns
Infocus: Data Recovery on Linux and ext3 SecurityFocus News
Malcode Context of API Abuse SANS Information Security Reading Room
Bugtraq: novius-os.5.0.1 Persistent XSS, LFI & Op... SecurityFocus Vulns
Infocus: WiMax: Just Another Security Challenge? SecurityFocus News
Four Attacks on OAuth - How to Secure Your OAuth ... SANS Information Security Reading Room
Bugtraq: CollabNet Subversion Edge indes local fi... SecurityFocus Vulns
Gunter Ollmann: Time to Squish SQL Injection SecurityFocus News
Security Vulnerabilities and Wireless LAN Technol... SANS Information Security Reading Room
More rss feeds from SecurityFocus SecurityFocus Vulns
Mark Rasch: Lazy Workers May Be Deemed Hackers SecurityFocus News
Animal Farm: Protection From Client-side Attacks ... SANS Information Security Reading Room
Adam O'Donnell: The Scale of Security SecurityFocus News
Auditing for Policy Compliance with QualysGuard a... SANS Information Security Reading Room
Mark Rasch: Hacker-Tool Law Still Does Little SecurityFocus News
Tracking Malware With Public Proxy Lists SANS Information Security Reading Room
More rss feeds from SecurityFocus SecurityFocus News
Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda SANS Information Security Reading Room

Bookmark and Share